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Employee Fringe Benefits in Employer Bankruptcy
The federal Bankruptcy Act provides uniform procedures for liqui-
dating and distributing the available assets of any business that is
unable to pay its debts.' While these procedures generally involve both
an equitable distribution of assets among creditors and the bankrupt's
subsequent discharge from his debt burden, for policy reasons some
claims are given priority over others, and certain of those are not dis-
charged.2 Under section 64(a)(2) the unpaid wage claims of workers,
clerks, servants, and salesmen have a priority and are not dischargeable;
they are paid out of available unsecured assets directly after expenses
for administering the estate and before any payment to general
creditors, tax collectors, or landlords.3 The priority covers wages earned
within three months of bankruptcy and is limited to $600 per claimant.4
This priority status for wage claims was originally established in
I898,5 when compensation in the form of fringe benefits, such as
vacation pay and health insurance, was unknown.6 In the early cases,
1 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § I et seq., 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended 11 U.S.C. §: 1
et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as NBA].
2 See NBA §§ 17, 64, 11 U.S.C. §§ 35, 104 (1970). On the policies of bankruptcy legisla-
tioii generally, see REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANuRaulrcY LAws OF THE UNrED
STATES, pt. I, at 61-84 (1973); D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRuprCY: PROBLEMS, PROCESS,
AND REFORM (1971) [hereinafter cited as STANLEY & GIRTH]; Levi & Moore, Bankruptcy and
Reorganization: A Survey of Changes (pts. I & II), 5 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 219 (1937).
3 The section provides: "(a) The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of
dividends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of
payment, shall be... (2) wages and commissions, not to exceed $600 to each claimant,
which have been earned within three months before the date of the commencement of
the proceeding, due to workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling, or city salesmen on salary or
commission basis, whole or part time, whether or not selling exclusively for the bankrupt
. ...." NBA § 64(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1970). This section applies to straight bank-
ruptcy proceedings, railroad reorganizations, farm debt relief, and arrangement proceed-
ings. Section 64 does not apply to Chapter X reorganization proceedings unless the ad-
ministering court enters an order that it apply. One instance in which such an order was
entered is the case of In re Wil-low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940). The Act
provides that section 64(a)(2) claims are not discharged by bankruptcy. NBA § 17(5), 11
U.S.C. § 35(5) (1970).
4 Id.
5 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 1 et seq., 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
6 Fringe benefits that pass from employer to employee take many forms. They are
generally understood to be compensation for services rendered, just like more traditional
wages. Some fringe benefits may be gifts, but most are the result of arms-length bargaining
between employer and employee. To the limited extent that gift transactions occur, they
are irrelevant to this comment, because promissory gifts do not usually create an en-
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therefore, priorities were granted to claims for sums owing on the
daily wage. In recent years, however, employee claims have largely
been for fringe benefits,7 and the courts have had to determine whether
such claims are entitled to section 64(a)(2) priority.
In two cases the Supreme Court has held that priority is not proper
where funds are owed to trustees and the employees' eventual receipt
of the funds either is dependent on future events or is to occur only in
the distant future.8 The Court has indicated that it believes the pur-
pose of the statute is to relieve the immediate hardship of the workers
and has based its denials of priority on holdings that the funds were
not "due to" the workers under the terms of the statute nor "wages"
of the type that must be paid to satisfy the relief purposes of the statute.
Several lower courts, in opinions between and after the two Supreme
Court opinions, have held in very similar fact situations that priority
is proper. The lower courts have ignored the Supreme Court opinions
or distinguished them as applying only where the funds are due in the
remote future or where trustees are claiming the funds. 9 The reluc-
tance of the lower courts to follow the rule that seems to emerge from
the Court's decisions'0 may be due in part to the arbitrary distinctions
and obscurities inherent in that rule, but it most probably is based on
the fact that the purpose stated by the Court as the basis for its rule-
relief of immediate hardship-makes no ense where the average period
between initiation of bankruptcy proceedings and distribution of
assets is at least two years."
This comment first explores the rule that has emerged from the
forceable claim against the donor. R.STATEMENT OF CoNmcrs § 90 (1932). Fringe
benefits given with the understanding that the benefit will terminate with termination
of employment, such as use of an employees' swimming pool, or a salesman's car, cannot
give rise to claims under section 64(a)(2). Benefits involving monetary payments from the
employer, such as pension fund contributions, vacation pay, holiday pay, and severance
pay, are the source of contention in bankruptcy proceedings. Generally these payments
take one of two forms. Either the employer holds the money until the employee is to
receive it, or periodic payments are made to a trust fund which then makes payments to
the employees at the appropriate time.
7 This may be attributed in part to changes in business practice-employers must
regularly meet their payrolls in order to survive, so that wages are generally paid up at
bankruptcy-and in part to the fact that labor now actively seeks fringe benefits as part
of the compensation scheme.
8 United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959); Joint Industry Board v.
United States, 391 U.S. 224 (1968).
9 See cases cited at notes 22 & 23 infra.
10 See text at notes 30-41 infra.
11 The study discussed in STANLEY & GIRTH, supra note 2, condudes: "For business
cases in our sample the average (mean) time from the filing of the petition until closing
was more than twenty-three months .. " Id. at 131. If any assets were available for
distribution, the length of time between filing and dosing increased. Id. at 132.
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decisions of the Supreme Court and demonstrates its deficiencies. It
then inquires into the purposes underlying the grant of priority in
order to develop a coherent rule for deciding whether fringe benefits
should receive priority as "wages" under section 64(a)(2).
I. THE STATE OF THE LAW
A. Case Law on Priority for Fringe Benefits
The Supreme Court first confronted the issue of priority for fringe
benefits in United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc.1 In that case the
bankrupt employer was bound by collective bargaining agreements to
contribute $8 per month per full-time employee to the trustees of a
union welfare fund. The welfare plans were organized to obtain "life
insurance, weekly sick benefits, hospital and surgical benefits," and
other advantages for members of the local unions. These benefits were
payable to employees only upon future contingencies such as death,
illness, or disability. By the terms of the trust agreement, workers
could not sell or assign their benefits. In the bankruptcy proceedings,
the trustees of the fund asked that section 64(a)(2) priority be given
the funds. This claim was disallowed by the referee,13 but on review
was granted by both the trial court 14 and the Court of Appeals,' 5 which
reasoned that the benefits obtained with the funds were in effect
additional wages.16 The Supreme Court reinstated the ruling of the
referee.
The Court concluded that "the contributions here are not 'due to
workmen,' nor have they the customary attributes of wages."'1 In reach-
ing this conclusion the Court emphasized that:
Trustees administered each plan under a formal trust agreement
and were authorized to formulate and establish conditions of
eligibility for benefits, control all the funds received, collect all con-
tributions, and in their "sole discretion" to handle all legal pro-
ceedings incident thereto. Title to all the funds, property, and in-
come was placed in the trustees exclusively .... 
18
The Court dismissed as irrelevant the fact that "unions bargain for
these contributions as though they were wages."' 9 The Court stated,
12 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
13 Bankruptcy judges were called bankruptcy referees at the time these cases were
decided.
14 154 F. Supp. 141 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
15 254 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1958).
1 Id. at 477.
17 United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 33 (1959).
18 Id. at 30.
19 Id. at 33.
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however, that although the contributions were not "due to workmen"
nor possessed of the customary attributes of wages, priority could be
granted if it was clear that the contributions satisfied "the purpose for
which Congress established the priority."20 The Court viewed the
priority as being intended "to enable employees displaced by bank-
ruptcy to secure, with some promptness, the money directly due to them
in back wages, and thus to alleviate in some degree the hardship that
unemployment usually brings to workers and their families. '21 Thus in
this case priority could not be granted; since workers could only receive
money from the trust fund if they died or were disabled-that is, on
future contingencies-the claimed payments could not satisfy the con-
gressional purpose of relieving immediate hardship.
Subsequent to Embassy Restaurant, lower courts and referees found
priority where no trust fund was involved,22 such as with vacation pay,
and where the payments were to be held by the trustees for only a
limited period of time after which right to the sums vested in the em-
ployees regardless of intervening events.23 The next Supreme Court
opinion, Joint Industry Board v. United States,24 did little to clarify the
status of claims for these types of payments.
In Joint Industry Board, trustees of a union pension fund, which pro-
vided benefits similar to those provided by the Embassy welfare fund,
claimed priority for unpaid employer contributions to the fund. Unlike
Embassy, the trust agreement provided that benefit payments would at
minimum return to the employee the total of the contributions
credited to his name, regardless of whether the employee left his job
before the contingencies entitling him to greater payments occurred.
Further, an employee could receive benefits upon leaving the industry as
well as upon death, retirement, or disability.25 Despite these differences
the Court concluded that Embassy Restaurant controlled.2 6 The Court
held that the claims did not have the "customary attributes of wages,"
because they were payable only to the trustees, who had the exclusive
right to hold and manage the fund. Though the contributions were
credited to individual employee accounts, nothing was payable to em-
20 Id.
21 Id. at 32.
22 Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local 3, IBEW, 386 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967) (vacation and
severance pay); In re Ad Service Engraving Co., 338 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1964) (vacation and
severance pay); In re Mergentime, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (vacation pay);
In re Wolfe Creation, Inc., BANtR. L. REP. 63,272 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (vacation pay); In re
Troymake Corp., BANKR. L. Rn,. 63,014 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) (vacation pay).
23 Sulmeyer v. Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Trust Fund, 301 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1962)
(vacation and holiday pay).
24 391 U.S. 224 (1968).
25 Id. at 226.
26 Id.
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ployees except upon the occurrence of certain events.27 Further, under
the fund agreement, employees could not assign their benefits.28 The
Court also relied on the finding that priority for these funds would not
satisfy the purpose of section 64(a)(2); because employees would receive
the funds claimed only on the occurrence of certain contingencies that
did not include employer bankruptcy, priority would not provide
prompt alleviation of the hardship caused by unemployment.29
B. The Uncertain Rule
The two Supreme Court cases seem to suggest that two requirements
must be met for fringe benefits to qualify for priority. The first require-
ment is that the fringe benefit at issue have the "customary attributes
of wages."'30 The second is that priority relieve immediate hardship
arising from unemployment caused by the employer's bankruptcy.8 1 In
reality, these two requirements are probably one; that is, a fringe bene-
fit has the "customary attributes of wages" if and only if the worker
has a sufficient legal interest in the fund to allow him to use it for im-
mediate relief during unemployment. 32 This rule would seem to con-
tinue to allow priority to claims for sums due directly to workers at the
end of a fixed period, such as vacation pay, and several lower courts,
avoiding both Embassy Restaurant and Joint Industry Board, have so
held.33 It would also seem to allow priority for sums due to trustees for
transfer at an early date to employees. 34
The basic problem with the Supreme Court's rule is that it simply
is not realistic to believe that in the present system, priority will "enable
27 Id. at 227.
28 Id. at 227 n.3.
29 Id. at 227-28.
30 See text and notes at notes 17 & 27 supra.
31 See text and notes at notes 20 & 29 supra.
32 The cases could also be read as establishing a rule based on the identity of the
person to whom the funds claimed were payable ("due to'"--in these cases to trustees
rather than workers. Aside from being a highly formalistic reading of the statute, such an
interpretation would base recovery entirely on adroit draftsmanship in employment con-
tracts and trust fund agreements. See 3A W. Cou.uM, BANKRUPTCY 64.20211] n.1 (1972);
48 VA. L. REv. 1308, 1312 (1962).
83 In In re S.E.S. Meat Co., Inc., BANKER. L. REP. 64,668 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (severance
pay), and In re Erie Forge Steel Corp., BANKER. L. REP. 63,581 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (vacation
pay), the courts based their grant of priority on early vacation pay cases without men-
tioning Embassy Restaurant or Joint Industry Board. The cases cited at note 22 supra like-
wise failed to distinguish Embassy Restaurant when they granted priority to vacation pay
and severance pay that was paid directly to workers.
34 The Ninth Circuit granted priority for a vacation pay trust fund on the authority of
Sulmeyer v. Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Trust Fund, 301 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1962), without
distinguishing Joint Industry Board. Bowman v. Bay Area Painter's Trust Fund, 447 F.2d
1106 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971).
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employees displaced by bankruptcy to secure, with some promptness,
the money directly due to them ... and thus to alleviate in some degree
the hardship that unemployment usually brings to workers and their
families."3 5 In the present system, the mean time between filing of the
bankruptcy petition and distribution of assets is two years.36
If workers could assign their claims against the bankrupt estate they
could, of course, realize their claim before distribution of assets and
thus obtain immediate reiief. Since 1906 it has been established that
assignment of a priority wage claim does not impair the priority status.
In Shropshire, Woodliff, & Co. v. Bush37 the Supreme Court held that
"[w]hen one has incurred a debt for wages due to workmen ... that
debt.., is entitled to priority .... The character of the debts was fixed
when they were incurred, and could not be changed by an assign-
ment."38 In Embassy Restaurant, the Supreme Court commended this
holding as providing a means whereby employees could realize their
claims before the dosing of the bankruptcy proceedings.3 9 In practice,
however, this avenue of relief is closed because there is no market for
workers' claims. Assignees are unwilling to buy workers' claims because
of uncertainty as to the amount that will ultimately be available for
distribution.40 Thus, there is no practical way that section 64(a)(2) can
provide immediate relief.41
II. A REINTERPRETATION OF SECTION 64(a)(2)
Relief of immediate hardship, the legislative purpose that the courts
have invoked in construing section 64(a)(2), has been shown to be in-
applicable in the context of the current bankruptcy system. Congress's
recent re-enactment4 2 of the priority, however, indicates an intent that
35 United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 32 (1959).
36 See note I1 supra.
87 204 U.S. 186 (1907).
38 Id. at 189.
89 359 U.S. 29, 34 (1959).
40 Conversations with Soia Mentschikoff, Professor of Law, and David Epstein, Visiting
Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School, 1974. See STANLEY & GmTH,
supra note 2, at 129 & 132. They found that priority creditors received on the average 36
percent of amounts proved and allowed. The length of time between filing and recovery
ranged from twelve to over forty-eight months. The combination of the 86 percent
chance of recovery and the uncertainty as to the time of recovery makes these claims un-
marketable.
41 Of course, this does not mean that an unemployed worker is without help from his
government. Unemployment compensation schemes are extensive. See 1B UN-MPL. INS.
RaP. § 3001 (1967).
42 Act of November 28, 1967, 81 Stat. 511 (1967). Section 64(a) was re-enacted with
amendments to subsection 64(a)(1). The Supreme Court recognized this as a re-affirmation
of subsection 64(a)(2). Joint Industry Board v. United States, 391 U.S. 224, 928 (1968).
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it continue to have significance in the bankruptcy system. Other policies
that might lie behind Congress's enactment and preservation of the
priority must therefore be examined. The dominant policy that
emerges from this examination is that of favoring the general economic
interests of a certain class of workers. If section 64(a)(2) is to serve this
purpose, it should be construed to embrace claims for regular wages but
not fringe benefits.
A. Reassessing the Purposes of the Priority
Although the legislative histories of the original Bankruptcy Act and
subsequent amendments contain no discussion of section 64(a)(2), 48
the terms of the act themselves suggest an intention to favor generally
a special class of workers, who have great economic need -and poor
bargaining position, by increasing their ultimate prospects of recovery
as well as alleviating the immediate hardship of their unemployment.4
I. The Nondischargeability of Section 64(aX2) Debts. Section 17(5)4r
excepts section 64(a)(2) claims from the dischargeability provisions that
apply to almost all other claims.46 This shows a clear intent to favor the
workers' ultimate prospects of recovery over the essence of the bank-
ruptcy system-allowing the bankrupt to start a new life unburdened
by his earlier mistakes.
2. The Income Level of Workers Protected by the Priority. From
the descriptions of the classes of workers in section 64(a)(2) itself,
it is apparent the congressional concern was focused on low income
workers. The priority is available only to "workmen, servants, clerks
or traveling, or city salesmen"4 7r-"persons of menial position and low
income" 48-whose earnings, when the Act was passed,49 probably were
sufficient only for day-to-day necessities. For these employees to lose
payment for their labor meant the loss of the ability to maintain even a
minimally decent standard of living."0 Employees to whom losing pay-
43 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541 § 1 et seq., S0 Stat. 544 (1898); Act of May 27, 1926, ch.
406 § 15, 44 Stat. 666 (1926) (raising maximum allowable claim to $600); Act of June 22,
1938, ch. 575, § 64, 52 Stat. 874 (1938) (re-ordering priorities within section 64); Act of
July 30, 1956, ch. 784, 70 Stat. 725 (1956) (clarifying status of salesmen).
44 See SA W. CoLLiER, supra note 32, at 64.201[3] n.7. The Bankruptcy Act favors
other classes because of their weak economic positions. For example, involuntary bank-
ruptcy cannot be imposed upon persons who earn less than $1500 per year or upon
farmers. NBA § 4(b), 11 U.S.C. § 22(b) (1970).
45 NBA § 17(5), 11 U.S.C. § 35(5) (1970).
46 NBA § 17, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
47 NBA § 64(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1970).
48 In re Paradise Catering Corp., 36 F. Supp. 974, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
49 Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541 § 1 et seq., 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
5o E.g., In re Guerwitz, 121 F. 982, 983 (2d Cir. 1903) (intended for "those who have
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ment for their labor meant only a reduction in amenities and con-
veniences were excluded.5' For example, in 1915 a general manager
earning $300 per month was denied priority in the same case in which
priority was granted to a shop foreman who also had supervisory du-
ties.52 The shop foreman, however, earned only $150 per month.5 3 The
courts have long recognized the social and moral judgment this classi-
fication represents. "The laborer," one court noted in 1930, "is gen-
erally dependent upon his wages for livelihood and the support of his
family .... Every consideration of morality, as well as public policy,
demands, therefore, that his wages be preserved to him and be given
priority over ordinary commercial claims."54
Even though the current duration of bankruptcy proceedings55 pre-
cludes viewing the priority as a means of providing subsistence itself,
the presumption remains that the favored class of workers can seldom
use their income for nonessentials. In discussing a laborer's personal
bankruptcy, the Eighth Circuit recently observed that "the fact that a
low income wage earner must forego the immediate enjoyment and
use of all his earnings because of the withholding of a part for tax pur-
poses does not change his continuing need to spend all his funds on
hand for personal and family sustenance whenever those funds become
available." 56
3. The Inability of Workers to Foresee Bankruptcy. Early judicial
interpretations of the section found a legislative concern with not only
the harsh results of bankruptcy for the laborer, but also the unfairness
of his suffering for ignorance of his employer's chances of going bank-
rupt.57 "The statute," Judge Learned Hand wrote, "was intended to
served .. . in a subordinate or menial capacity and who are supposed to be dependent
upon their earnings for their present support."); Manly v. Hood, 37 F.2d 212, 213 (4th
Cir. 1930) (intended for those "dependent upon [their] wages for livelihood and the sup-
port of [their] famil[ies]'); In re Caldwell, 164 F. 515, 516 (E.D. Ark. 1908) (intended "to
protect those who are dependent on their daffy earnings for their support"). See also 3A
W. COIJ.R, supra note 32, at 64.204[4] n.26.
51 Frasher v. Robinson, 458 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1972) (general manager of business);
In re Paradise Catering Corp., 36 F. Supp. 974 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (actress earning $400 per
week); In re Estey, 6 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (teacher); In re Lawsam Electric Co.,
300 F. 736 (S.DN.Y. 1924) (chief designer); In re All Star Feature Corp., 231 F. 251
(S.D.N.Y. 1916) (actress earning $5000 per month). Contra, In re New England Thread,
158 F. 788 (Ist Cir. 1907) (salesman earning $4000 per year). See also 3A W. CosaFa,
supra note 32, at 64.204E4] n.26.
52 Blessing v. Blanchard, 223 F. 35 (9th Cir. 1915).
53 Id. at 37.
54 Manly v. Hood, 37 F.2d 212, 213-14 (4th Cir. 1930).
55 See note 11 supra.
56 Gehrig v. Shreves, 491 F.2d 668, 672 (8th Cir. 1974).
57 Manly v. Hood, 37 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1930); In re Lawsam Electric Co., 300 F. 736
(SMD.N.Y. 1924).
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favor those who could not be expected to know anything of the credit
of their employer, but must accept a job as it comes."'6 s The priority
favors that class of laborers least likely to have or understand informa-
tion about the employer's economic health.
B. The Contemporary Meaning of Section 64(a)(2)
Increasing the general prospects, rather than the immediacy, of re-
covery of an especially deserving class of claimants appears to be the
element of the original purpose that remains viable. It might be argued
that this goal is best satisfied by granting priority to all fringe benefits.
The rationale for this step would be that fringe benefits are as much
expected and bargained-for income as are wages. 59 The Commission
on Bankruptcy Laws, which issued its report in July, 1973, adopted this
view.60 A fair evaluation of congressional intent, however, indicates
that construing section 64(a)(2) to cover fringe benefits does not satisfy
the intent to aid a class that can "ill-afford to be classified as general
creditors."61
1. Structuring the Priority to Favor the Ultimate Recovery of the
Target Class. Paid vacations, pensions, and severance pay are rewards
for accepting lower wages at the time they are earned.62 Employees who
receive such benefits have bargained for automatic savings plans in
exchange for lower regular wages. Employees who can afford to defer
compensation are not within the class-"those who are supposed to be
dependent on their earnings for their present support"6 -- that Congress
intended to protect when it enacted section 64(a)(2). Proposals that
reject this interpretation of section 64(a)(2) and recommend priority for
all fringe benefits because "union negotiators agree to smaller direct
wages in exchange for greater fringe benefits" 64 overlook the fact that
employees can accept this exchange only if their income is sufficiently
above subsistence level.
A grant of priority for fringe benefits does not merely strike a new
balance between conventional creditors and the employees to whom
58 In re Lawsam Electric Co., 300 F. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
59 United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 33 (1959): "It is contended,
however, that since 'unions bargain for these contributions as though they were wages'
and industry likewise considers them 'as an integral part of the wage package,' they must
in law be considered 'wages.'"
60 REPORT OF THE COMMISSON ON Ta BANKupTcy LAws, supra note 2, at 215.
61 In re Paradise Catering Corp., 36 F. Supp. 974, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
62 "The payments are certainly not gifts." United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc.,
359 U.S. 29, 37 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
63 In re Guerwitz, 121 F. 982, 983 (2d Cir. 1903).
64 United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.. 29, 33 (1959).
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the benefits are owed. If fringe benefits are granted priority, the 64(a)(2)
recovery of lower-paid workers who have no such benefits would be
reduced in some bankruptcies-in flat contradiction to the purpose of
the statute. If, for example, the fund to be distributed is sufficient to
pay 75 percent of every eligible employee's claim, the "fringe" incre-
ment of some employees' claims might be satisfied before the regular
wage claims of other employees.65
Increases in the general standard of living and the unionization of
many industries have brought many workers covered by the technical
statutory language to a wage level where they can afford to take their
payments as fringe benefits; the categories Congress devised for identi-
fying the class of persons it intended to aid have grown obsolete. To
satisfy the legislative purpose of favoring ultimate recovery by a certain
class, courts must look to other elements of the statute for workable
limitations. The "customary attributes of wages" language provides
such a limitation. Limiting the priority to regular wages-compensation
made available for discretionary spending by the employee as he com-
pletes units of work-would effectively, though not literally, confine
the benefits to the workers Congress wanted to reach.6
2. Incidental Effects of the "Regular Wages" Interpretation. The
"regular wages" construction of section 64(a)(2) would permit some dis-
tributions to employees not within the class intended to be favored
because employees who receive fringe benefits would still receive
priority for their regular wage claims. Recovery by those workers,
however, would not significantly frustrate the aims of the statute. The
limitation of claims to the previous three months' wages, not to exceed
$600,07 assures that the regular wage claims of better-paid employees
will not consume an excessive portion of the funds available for
distribution.
65 For example, a business employs two categories of workers, one which receives only
a weekly wage of $150 per week and one which receives $150 per week plus the equivalent
of $15 per week in fringe benefits. At bankruptcy, the first group is owed two weeks' wages,
or $300, and the second is also owed two weeks' regular wages, $300, plus an accumulation
of two months' fringe benefits, $120, for a total of $420. If all section 64(a)(2) claims are
paid at 75 percent, the group earning only the weekly wage will receive $225 while the
group receiving both the weekly wage and the fringe benefits would receive $315.
The proposal of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws partially eliminates this
problem by establishing two priorities--one for sums due 'directly to workers and one for
sums due to trustees on behalf of workers. The problem partially remains, however, be-
cause some fringe benefits are explicity included in the first priority. REPORT OF THE CoM-
MISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws, pt. II, p. 110 (1973).
66 The proposal would overturn the extension of section 64(a)(2) already made by lower
courts in vacation and severance pay cases. See note 22 supra.
67 NBA § 64(a)(2), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1970). For the text of the section, see note 3
supra.
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3. Alternative Methods of Restricting the Priority to the Target
Class. The alternatives are to exclude completely from section 64(a)(2)
priority either all employees who receive fringe benefits or the em-
ployees who receive fringe benefits and others whose earnings are
comparable. The first alternative would require an interpretation too
inventive to be reconciled with the statute's facially unambiguous
description of the classes of employees to be benefitted. More important,
it would treat equally employees with comprehensive fringe benefits
and those with nominal ones. In contrast, allowing regular wage claims
by both these groups would permit the latter, presumably lower-paid
employees, to recover a larger percentage of their total claim.68 The
first alternative would also cause employees who are at the same income
level but receive their compensation in different forms to be treated
unequally. Fringe benefit recipients would be excluded from the
priority, but employees receiving economically indistinguishable com-
pensation would be included.
The second alternative, although attractive in light of the legislative
purpose, requires an even heavier gloss on the statute than the first
alternative. Section 64(a)(2) cannot be read to permit a judicially
created income cutoff beyond which the job descriptions in the statute
have no application. Until Congress sees fit to substitute more respon-
sive criteria for the categories currently used in the section, occasional
unintended results must be tolerated out of respect for legislative
prerogatives.
C. Policy Considerations Beyond Section 64(a)(2)
The more general policies of the Bankruptcy Act also deserve con-
sideration. General creditors are affected by the interpretation placed
on section 64(a)(2). The special equity of the claims of workers who
qualify for the priority is based on their need for payment at least up
to basic subsistence level. Fringe benefit claims are in many ways not
distinguishable from other debts of the bankrupt, and basic principles
of equity suggest that all claims against the bankrupt be treated alike.9
The bankrupt's interests must also be considered. Perhaps the most
compelling policy underlying the liquidation chapters of the Act is to
forgive the bankrupt's obligations so that he can begin a new financial
68 The exclusion of the employee who is only slightly better off than the employee re-
ceiving only regular wages might seem arbitrary. A line must be drawn, however, and the
distinction between regular wages and fringe benefits is an administrable one.
69 "The broad purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to bring about an equitable distribu-
tion of the bankrupt's estate .... ." Kothe v. R. C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 227
(1930). See also 3A W. COLTLIR, supra note 32, at 64.02[6].
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life.70 This policy is based on Congress's perception that the investment
of risk capital has beneficial effects beyond the satisfaction of those who
buy the production such investment yields.7 1 Public subsidy of those
who undertake to begin new enterprises after a bankruptcy is appro-
priate. Broadening the coverage of section 64(a)(2) reduces that subsidy,
because the debts that have this priority are nondischargeable .
2 Of
course, if the bankrupt is a corporation, liquidation and dissolution of
the corporate entity, in effect, discharge all unpaid wage claims under
the authority of state corporation actsY3 Fringe benefit claims are not
crucial to employees, but cumulatively these debts create a substantial
burden for a noncorporate bankrupt attempting to finance a new busi-
ness. All the creditors of the new enterprise would be inferior in
priority to the nondischarged claims, and would adjust accordingly the
price of the capital and materials they provide. To the extent that,
broadening the priority dampens the incentive for investment of risk
capital, inclusion of fringe benefits within section 64(a)(2) reduces the
availability of jobs. Thus, the very class of creditors that would be
expected to profit from enlargement of the priority might be signifi-
cantly prejudiced.
CONCLUSION
In order to resolve the present ambiguities in the interpretation of
section 64(a)(2), the courts should limit coverage of the statute to
regular wages, excluding all fringe benefits. The current inclusion of
some fringe benefits is undesirable and without foundation in the pur-
pose of the priority. Limiting section 64(a)(2) to regular wages has the
effect, consistent with legislative purpose, of providing a bright line
test for restricting the section's benefits to the class of workers in special
need of protection.
Ann Rae Heitland
70 See Levi & Moore, supra note 2.
71 NBA § 17, 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1970).
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., BUSINMS CoRrORATON AcT § 23, 1 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.23 (1973).
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